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INTRODUCTION
The Duke Law Journal’s Forty-Sixth Annual Administrative
Law Symposium addresses the timely and important topic of patent
1
exceptionalism. As I have explored elsewhere, administrative law
exceptionalism—the misperception that a particular regulatory field
is so different from the rest of the regulatory state that general
administrative law principles do not apply—is by no means unique to
2
patent law. Scholars, attorneys, and agency officials in various
regulatory fields ranging from immigration to tax have sought,
contrary to the Supreme Court’s general guidance, “to carve out an
approach to administrative review good for [the regulatory field’s]
3
law only.” It appears that similarly exceptionalist views pervade

Copyright © 2016 Christopher J. Walker.
† Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University. Thanks are due to the Duke Law Journal editors and the Symposium organizer,
Melissa Wasserman, for inviting me to participate in this terrific Symposium and to the
Symposium participants and my colleague, Guy Rub, for helpful comments.
1. For an overview of the Symposium, see James Donald Smith, Foreword: Patent
Exceptionalism with Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551 (2016).
2. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?,
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 42–43; Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax
Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 222 (2014); Christopher J. Walker, The Costs of
Immigration Exceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/the-costs-of-immigration-exceptionalism-by-chris-walker
[https://perma.cc/82QT-4VTV].
3. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011); see
id. at 56 (finding “no reason why . . . review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency
expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as . . . review of other regulations”). To be
sure, this does not mean that administrative law is uniform across all regulatory contexts.
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patent law, although the patent law scholars assembled for this
4
Symposium do not seem to share those exceptionalist views.
This Essay focuses on one of the main debates from the
Symposium: whether courts should apply Chevron deference to
interpretations of substantive patent law advanced by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO). Part I frames the debate about
whether Chevron deference should apply, contrasting the positions
5
taken by Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai on the one hand, and John
6
Golden on the other. After agreeing with Professors Benjamin and
Rai that certain PTO interpretations of substantive patent law are
probably eligible for Chevron deference, Part II outlines how a
stronger case could be made for why it is worth the PTO’s time and
energy to seek Chevron deference from the Supreme Court. Among
other reasons, the PTO and its U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
lawyers should request such deference to weaken the Federal
Circuit’s control over substantive patent law and reverse an era of
patent stare decisis. The Essay concludes by urging patent law

Instead, the Administrative Procedure Act and the Supreme Court’s administrative law
doctrines set the default standards for agency action and for judicial review of agency action. As
the Court has explained (in the patent law context, no less), congressional departures from these
defaults “must be clear.” Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999); see also 2 RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2 at 772 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that
Dickinson “seemed to establish a presumption in favor of uniformity in standards for judicial
review of agency actions that can be overcome only by ‘clear’ evidence in support of a
departure”).
4. These nonexceptionalist views are on full display in the scholars’ written contributions
to the Symposium. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era
of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2016); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman,
Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601 (2016); John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron:
The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 (2016); Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65
DUKE L.J. 1701 (2016). But see Orin Kerr, Should the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Get
Chevron
Deference?,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Feb.
19,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/19/should-the-u-s-patentand-trademark-office-get-chevron-deference [https://perma.cc/6Y9F-JJN6] (responding to
comments by Jonathan Masur, one of the Symposium participants); Orin Kerr, The Case for
Patent Law and Criminal Law Exceptionalism in the Administrative State, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Feb.
12,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/12/the-case-for-patent-law-and-criminal-law-exceptionalism-in-theadministrative-state [https://perma.cc/MV5N-R2ZC] (“[P]atent law and criminal law do not rely
on delegations of lawmaking authority. As a result, I think it would be a bad idea to apply
deferential standards in patent law or criminal law.”).
5. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597. This Symposium contribution builds on their
prior work in the area. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the
APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007).
6. Golden, supra note 4, at 1658.
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scholars to play a more active role in urging courts to abandon patent
exceptionalism.
I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW
Featured at this Symposium is a growing scholarly debate about
whether agency statutory interpretations embraced by the PTO’s
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) are eligible for Chevron
deference. Put differently, the question is whether courts must defer
to the PTAB’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous provisions of
7
the Patent Act. This is a new debate in light of new legislation.
Congress created the PTAB in 2011 as part of the Leahy-Smith
8
America Invents Act (AIA), which was “the most significant
overhaul to our patent system, since the founding fathers first
conceived of codifying a grand bargain between society and
9
invention.” Professors Benjamin and Rai argue that certain PTAB
interpretations of substantive patent law would be entitled to
10
Chevron deference if the agency sought such deference. John
Golden, by contrast, contends that the PTO still does not have
Chevron-level interpretive authority regarding substantive patent
law—at least for core questions of substantive patent law such as the
patentability requirements in the Patent Act. Instead, Professor
Golden argues that such lack of deference may not be too important
in light of the agency’s position as a prime mover in developing patent
11
law.
Understanding their disagreement requires a deep dive into
12
Mead’s muddy waters. The inquiry from United States v. Mead
remains the Supreme Court’s governing standard for determining
whether Congress intended for an agency’s statutory interpretation to
carry the force of law such that it becomes eligible for Chevron
13
deference. As many administrative law scholars have noted over the

7. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
9. David Kappos, Re-Inventing the US Patent System, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG
FROM
USPTO’S
LEADERSHIP
(Sept.
16,
2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventing_the_us_patent [https://perma.cc/3KCTSSEV].
10. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597.
11. Golden, supra note 4, at 1658.
12. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
13. Id. at 227–30.
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years, the Mead standard is hopelessly confusing. To be sure, in City
15
of Arlington v. FCC, the Court clarified that Chevron deference
applies whenever “Congress has unambiguously vested the [agency]
with general authority to administer the [statute] through rulemaking
and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue [is]
16
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” But uncertainty
persists when Congress has not granted general rulemaking or formal
adjudicative authority. As the Mead opinion itself noted, the Supreme
Court has “sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was
17
afforded.”
Professors Benjamin, Golden, and Rai all agree that PTAB
decisions fall into this uncertain category—even after the AIA
granted the PTO rulemaking power to “prescribe regulations . . .
establishing and governing” certain PTAB review proceedings as well
as “the relationship of such review to other proceedings under [the
18
Patent Act].” As Professor Golden contends, the AIA provides the
PTO rulemaking authority over agency procedures, but generally not
19
over substantive patent law. In other words, the AIA’s “provisions
and broader context provide little reason to suspect that Congress
snuck delegation of Chevron-level authority for the PTO through the
20
back door of PTAB post-issuance proceedings.” Moreover, as
Professor Golden argues, the PTAB adjudicatory processes fall short
of formal adjudication (as that term is contemplated by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)) and seem more analogous to
the type of agency rulings at issue in Mead, which the Court deemed
21
ineligible for Chevron deference.
14. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency
Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 480 (2002);
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003);
see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s new doctrine is neither
sound in principle nor sustainable in practice.”).
15. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
16. Id. at 1874.
17. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(4), 326(a)(4) (2012).
19. Golden, supra note 4, at 1672–76.
20. Id. at 1675–76.
21. See id. at 1678–81. Note that the Federal Circuit seems to believe that at least one
PTAB proceeding—inter partes review—requires APA-level formal adjudication. See, e.g., Dell
Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, No. 2015-1513, 2016 WL 1019075, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2016);
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 2014-1516, 2016 WL 520236, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
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Professors Benjamin and Rai agree that PTAB review
proceedings do not meet the APA’s definition of formal adjudication.
They argue, however, that the review procedures nevertheless have
sufficient rigor and formality to be eligible for Chevron deference, at
least where the PTO Director has exercised her authority to
22
“declar[e] an opinion precedential or conduct[] a rehearing or both.”
Professors Benjamin and Rai conclude that “[t]he tools . . . for
23
Chevron deference, in other words, are in the Director’s hands.”
Both sides make reasonable arguments about whether PTAB
interpretations of substantive patent law are eligible for Chevron
deference. If pressed to take sides, Professors Benjamin and Rai seem
to have the better argument under Mead and its progeny—especially
in light of the sweeping authority the AIA grants to the PTAB. As
another contributor to this Symposium has persuasively argued in a
previous article, the AIA “rejects over two hundred years of court
dominance in patent policy by anointing the PTO as the chief
24
expositor of substantive patent law standards.” It is, however, a close
question in an area of the law that is quite uncertain. Congressional
action in the form of the AIA, coupled with the PTO Director’s
ability to seek rehearing and declare a PTAB decision precedential,
tip the scales—at least for me—in favor of Chevron deference
applying under Mead and its progeny.
II. THE STRONGER CASE FOR SEEKING CHEVRON DEFERENCE
This Essay does not endeavor to bring more clarity to this
question, which is already well argued in the other contributions to
this Symposium. Instead, it pushes back on another conclusion
reached by Professors Benjamin and Rai, namely, that “the PTO’s
failure to push for deference may reflect a calculation that the
benefits of such a push will be fairly low, because of uncertainty about
10, 2016); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That the PTAB
may already have to adhere to the procedures required for APA-level formal adjudication may
be an additional reason why the PTO should seek Chevron deference. Thanks to Melissa
Wasserman for bringing this development to my attention.
22. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1590; see id. at 1578–90 (providing extended analysis
of the legal question).
23. Id. at 1590.
24. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1965 (2013); see also id. at 1966 (“Applying administrative
law principles to the AIA provides that the PTO’s legal interpretations of the Patent Act, as
announced by its new adjudicatory proceedings, are entitled to the highly deferential standard
of review articulated in Chevron . . . .”).
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the Court actually deferring in situations in which it seems
25
appropriate.” They base this argument in part on “the Supreme
Court’s recent lack of interest (and the Federal Circuit’s longstanding
lack of interest) in applying conventional administrative law
26
principles in the patent context.” As further detailed below,
Professors Benjamin and Rai could and should make a stronger case
for the PTO to urge the Court to reject patent exceptionalism and
apply Chevron deference to certain PTAB interpretations of
substantive patent law.
A. The Relationship Between the PTO and the DOJ
Professors Benjamin and Rai mainly focus their analysis on
27
whether the PTO Director will seek Chevron deference. That
inquiry is too limited. The cost-benefit analysis about whether to seek
Chevron deference is calculated not only by the agency head, but also
by the agency’s litigators. For the PTO, those litigators include
attorneys outside of the agency who work on the DOJ’s Civil
Appellate Staff and in the Solicitor General’s Office. Importantly,
these DOJ attorneys are administrative law generalists who represent
diverse federal agencies and defend agency statutory interpretations
in a variety of contexts. Unlike officials at agencies that may have
long suffered from administrative law exceptionalism, the DOJ
attorneys should be much more receptive to an argument that patent
law is not exceptional and that general administrative law principles
apply. Indeed, as I have explored elsewhere (and experienced
firsthand working on the DOJ’s Civil Appellate Staff), the DOJ
litigators have a “playbook for developing and defending [agency]
28
statutory interpretations.” And that playbook tends to be based on
general principles of administrative law that apply irrespective of the
particular regulatory context.

25. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1599.
26. Id. at 1597.
27. To be fair, Professors Benjamin and Rai recognize the interaction between the PTO
and its DOJ lawyers. See, e.g., id. at 1597 (noting that “the agency and its lawyers (both at the
PTO and the DOJ)” must consider courts’ “recent lack of interest” in applying administrative
law principles to patent law).
28. Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
73, 77 (2013).
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This is not just a theory. Take, for instance, Cuozzo Speed
29
Technologies, LLC v. Lee —a case the Supreme Court will decide
30
later this Term. One of the questions presented in Cuozzo is
“[w]hether the PTO acted within its rulemaking authority in
promulgating 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b), which . . . provides that patent
claims shall be given their ‘broadest reasonable construction’ during
31
inter partes review proceedings.” In upholding the regulation, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found it appropriate to
apply Chevron deference: “Because Congress authorized the PTO to
prescribe regulations, the validity of the regulation is analyzed
32
according to the familiar Chevron framework.”
In its briefing before the Supreme Court, the PTO—through its
DOJ lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office and on the Civil
Appellate Staff—advanced a generalist administrative law position to
defend the PTO’s regulation. It argued, first and foremost, that under
the AIA “Congress has granted the PTO broad authority to
‘prescribe regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes
33
review.’” The PTO then made a Chevron-eligible argument relying
on Mead:
Pursuant to [the America Invents Act’s] grant of rulemaking power,
and following notice and comment, the PTO promulgated a
regulation . . . . Such a regulation is “binding in the courts unless
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 227 (2001). The PTO acted well within its discretion in
34
adopting [that regulation].

29. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84
U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446).
30. Id.
31. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at I, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC,
793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446)
[hereinafter Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp.].
32. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279. The Federal Circuit made clear that it did “not draw that
conclusion from any finding that Congress has newly granted the PTO power to interpret
substantive statutory ‘patentability’ standards.” Id.; see id. at 1290 (Newman, C.J., dissenting)
(analyzing the text of the AIA and “discern[ing] no authorization to the PTO to change the law
of how claims of issued patents are construed”).
33. Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp., supra note 31, at 9 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012)).
34. Id.; accord Brief for the Respondent at 34, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793
F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446)
[hereinafter Fed. Gov’t Merits Br.].
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Indeed, the PTO expressly rejected the argument that was raised by
the petitioner and arguably supported by Federal Circuit precedent,
that is, that the PTO’s rulemaking authority does not extend to
35
substantive patent law. “Within the four corners of the AIA itself,”
the PTO argued, the “petitioner identifies no indication that the
36
PTO’s rulemaking authority is limited to procedural matters.”
The importance of Cuozzo should not be overstated. Even if the
Supreme Court agrees that Chevron deference applies to the PTO’s
regulation, that does not necessarily mean that PTAB adjudicatory
decisions are similarly eligible for Chevron deference. (If the PTO is
found to have substantive interpretive authority under the AIA,
however, that certainly bolsters Professors Benjamin and Rai’s
argument.) Nor would such a victory necessarily mean that the PTO
has broad, substantive interpretive authority that would extend to
core questions of patent law, such as the requirements for
37
patentability. Instead, Cuozzo is offered as an example of the
dangers of focusing myopically on the PTO Director as the
decisionmaker.
As discussed in Part II.B, the PTO and its DOJ litigators have
not yet aggressively pushed for the end of patent exceptionalism. But
especially in light of the enactment of the AIA, the creation of the
PTAB, and the PTO’s briefing in Cuozzo, the time seems ripe for
such a move.
B. Chevron’s Weakening of the Federal Circuit
Professors Benjamin and Rai argue that the Supreme Court is
unlikely to embrace calls to abandon patent exceptionalism because,
“Zurko . . . notwithstanding, recent Supreme Court opinions in the
patent arena have tended to reject standard administrative law
principles. These opinions have instead given precedence to a forceful

35. Fed. Gov’t Merits Br., supra note 34, at 34–37; accord Fed. Gov’t Br. in Opp., supra
note 31, at 15 (arguing that “nothing in the AIA’s delegation of rulemaking authority limits the
agency to ‘procedural’ rules” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4))).
36. Fed. Gov’t Merits Br., supra note 34, at 37.
37. In particular, the PTO later suggests that the AIA may not have granted the PTO the
authority “to issue legislative rules governing the basic conditions for patentability,” id. at 39,
and that, in all events, the regulation at issue—the PTO’s embrace of the broadest-reasonableconstruction approach—is procedural, not substantive, under Federal Circuit precedent. Id. at
39–41. In other words, the substantive–procedural debate in Cuozzo is much narrower than the
question of whether the PTO has broad interpretive authority over core substantive questions
of patent law, such as patent-eligibility, novelty, and nonobviousness.
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38

reading of the Court’s own pre-APA cases.” It is true that in at least
39
one recent case, Kappos v. Hyatt, the Court seemed to reject the
40
PTO’s call to apply general administrative law principles. But in
most cases to date, the PTO has not aggressively argued against the
Federal Circuit’s longstanding position of patent exceptionalism. Nor
has the PTO asked the Court to weigh in on whether courts or the
agency should be the authoritative interpreter of substantive patent
law. Things would change if the PTO actually requested Chevron
deference.
One reason for optimism is the Supreme Court’s growing
discontent with the patent law precedent created by the Federal
Circuit, which is the federal court of appeals with exclusive
41
jurisdiction over patent-related disputes. For example, in the last
five years, the Court has reviewed twenty-four cases from the Federal
42
Circuit, and it has reversed two-thirds of the time. With respect to
October Term 2013, in which the Court considered six patent cases,
“the Court unanimously reversed in the first five (a remarkable 0-for45 record for the Federal Circuit in terms of persuading Supreme
Court justices), and in a sixth and final case the Court upheld a

38. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1591. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s tax exceptionalist view and held that the APA’s “standards governing judicial
review of findings of fact made by federal administrative agencies” should apply “when the
Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).”
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
39. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012).
40. Id. at 1696 (“We reject the Director’s contention that background principles of
administrative law govern the admissibility of new evidence and require a deferential standard
of review in a § 145 proceeding.”). It is important to note that the PTO Director conceded that
the administrative-record rule established by the APA did not apply because the Patent Act
allows for the introduction of new evidence. See id. And the Court limited its holding to those
circumstances where the general APA provisions do not apply: “In light of these aspects of
§ 145 proceedings—at least in those cases in which new evidence is presented to the district
court on a disputed question of fact—we are not persuaded by the Director’s suggestion that
§ 145 proceedings are governed by the deferential principles of agency review.” Id. at 1697.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents or
plant variety protection”); id. § 1295(a)(4) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions from, inter alia, the PTAB and the PTO Director).
42. These numbers are from October Term 2010 through October Term 2014, as collected
by
SCOTUSblog.
See
Stat
Pack
Archive,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack [https://perma.cc/PU8U-5DG8]. To be sure, a
two-thirds reversal rate is not atypical among circuits. See, e.g., SCOTUSblog Stat Pack, Oct.
Term 2014, SCOTUSBLOG 3 (June 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/SB_scorecard_OT14.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH95-2GKT] (noting an
overall 72% reversal rate).
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splintered en banc Federal Circuit decision but took exception to
43
much of the doctrine that had produced the ruling.” As one
commentator noted earlier this year, “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has
tried for 10 years to rein in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and its strongly pro-patent interpretations of the law, yet the
44
tug-of-war does not appear to be letting up.”
In such an environment, the Supreme Court may be more willing
to embrace Chevron deference as a means of weakening the Federal
Circuit. After all, as Melissa Wasserman has argued, “the PTO has a
comparative institutional advantage over the Federal Circuit and . . .
the Federal Circuit does not emerge as a clear winner with respect to
45
the comparative risk of interest group influence.” By declaring the
agency the authoritative interpreter of patent law, which is what
46
Chevron deference entails, the Supreme Court would be shifting
power away from the Federal Circuit at a time when the Court seems
frustrated with the Federal Circuit’s substantive approach to patent
law. This shift has the additional value of “usher[ing] the patent
system into the modern administrative era, which has long recognized
47
the deficiencies associated with judge-driven policy.”

43. Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, The Federal Circuit Under Fire, SUPREME COURT
WATCH,
Fall
2014, at 40,
http://www.mto.com/Templates/media/files/Reprints/Josh%20Patashnik/
Bleich%20%20Patashnik%20--%20Supreme%20Court%20Watch%20Fall%202014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RR84-FN6Z]; accord Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating
the
Federal
Courts
of
Appeals,
2
LANDSLIDE,
Jan.-Feb.
2010,
at
2,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_
Hofer.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8KZ-QCWW] (“Though the sample size of patentrelated cases reviewed and decided by the Supreme Court is small, the trend is clear. The
Supreme Court is actively seeking to assert its views in patent law rather than letting the Federal
Circuit determine the fate of patent law on its own.”).
44. Steven Seidenberg, Patent Tension: The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
Continue Their Tug-of-War over Interpretations of Patent Law, ABA J. (Jan. 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_c
ontinues_between_federal [https://perma.cc/UFB6-6LW3]. Patent law scholarship has
documented this trend. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049,
1076–83 (2014); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from
the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63–64
(2013).
45. Wasserman, supra note 24, at 1967; see id. at 2007–18 (exploring in greater detail this
normative case for Chevron deference to PTO legal interpretations).
46. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005) (noting that when Chevron applies, the agency—not the reviewing court—is “the
authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes”).
47. Wasserman, supra note 24, at 1966.
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C. Chevron’s Displacement of the Era of Stare Decisis
A core reason why Professors Benjamin and Rai believe that it is
not expedient to ask the Supreme Court for Chevron deference to
PTAB legal interpretations centers on “the Supreme Court’s
apparent decision to deprioritize administrative law in favor of the
stare decisis effect of Court cases that predate the rise of the modern
48
administrative state.” To borrow from the title of their article, they
argue that we live in “an era of patent stare decisis,” where judicial
49
precedent trumps agency statutory interpretation. This explanation,
however, underestimates the Supreme Court’s breathtaking extension
of Chevron deference to trump judicial precedent in National Cable &
50
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.
In Brand X, the Court reaffirmed the Chevron doctrine: “If a
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is
reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from
51
what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” The
Court then took that principle one step further. The Ninth Circuit
below had refused to afford Chevron deference because it had
already construed the same statutory provision in a conflicting
manner. It thus held that its precedent foreclosed the agency’s
52
interpretation. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “[o]nly
a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses
the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the
53
agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.” Once a
court has identified an ambiguity, there is a “presumption” that
Congress “desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
54
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”
48. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1565.
49. Id. at 1563.
50. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83; cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1594 (noting that, if
Brand X were to apply here, “administrative interpretations of the patent statute could trump
prior judicial interpretations unless those prior judicial determinations held that the
interpretation in question was the only permissible one”).
51. Id. at 980 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44, 834 n.11 (1984)).
52. Id. at 982.
53. Id. at 982–83.
54. Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)). See
generally Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV.
139, 183–89 (2012) (exploring the application of Brand X in a variety of regulatory contexts).
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To the extent Brand X could have been viewed as an outlier, one
need look no further than the Court’s subsequent decision in Negusie
55
v. Holder. There, the agency had interpreted a provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to require the denial of asylum to
any otherwise qualifying noncitizen if he had persecuted others in his
native country, even if his participation in persecution was not
56
voluntary. The Court concluded that Chevron deference did not
apply because the agency had erroneously believed that it was bound
by prior Supreme Court precedent and thus had not exercised its
Chevron discretion to provide an alternative interpretation. The
Court, however, did not provide its own interpretation either. It
instead remanded the question to the agency, concluding that, when
“the [agency] has not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret
the statute in question, the proper course, except in rare
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation
57
or explanation.” The Court grounded its remand decision in Brand
X: “This remand rule exists, in part, because ‘ambiguities in statutes
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of
authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable
58
fashion.’”
It is worth noting that Negusie also illustrates the limitations of
59
Professor Golden’s PTO-as-prime-mover argument. There are no
doubt many unanswered questions of substantive patent law where
the PTO can move first, but the PTO nevertheless operates in an era
of patent stare decisis that limits many potential moves. Indeed, as
Professor Golden has argued elsewhere, the agency’s “visible
struggles to make sense of the court’s rulings [on subject-matter
eligibility] have strengthened my sense that, at least absent
congressional action to clarify subject-matter eligibility directly, the
[PTO] will have trouble improving the situation as long as it has only
60
‘interpretive authority bound to preexisting judicial precedent.’” If

55. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
56. Id. at 514 (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)).
57. Id. at 523.
58. Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005)). See generally Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1561–79 (2015) (exploring the
evolution of the ordinary remand rule).
59. Golden, supra note 6, at 1689–95.
60. John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1775
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Chevron deference were to apply, Brand X and Negusie would
remove any such limitations.
When Brand X and Negusie are read together, it is easier to
appreciate the PTO’s powerful argument in favor of reversing the
prior era of patent stare decisis. To date, the PTO has not invoked
Brand X to trump Supreme Court or Federal Circuit precedent on
substantive patent law. But from its experience in Negusie and Brand
X, the DOJ is no doubt well aware of the power of Brand X to trump
any stare decisis effect of prior judicial precedent. So perhaps it is
only a matter of time.
D. Chevron’s Power to Reorient the Agency–Court Relationship and
Rein in Lower Courts
Professors Benjamin and Rai also question the potential benefits
of Chevron deference, in that it may not make a difference in whether
61
a court upholds an agency’s interpretation. To support this
conclusion they cite the empirical work of Bill Eskridge and Lauren
Baer, which “suggests that the Supreme Court often fails to apply
Chevron in many areas of substantive law” and “that at the Supreme
Court win rates under Chevron are lower than win rates under
62
seemingly less deferential regimes.” The Eskridge and Baer study,
however, did not focus on the effect of Chevron deference on
displacing prior judicial precedent; indeed, it predated Negusie. The
Brand X version of Chevron deference, as discussed in Part II.C,
would force the Supreme Court to reconsider its prior precedent
interpreting substantive patent law—at least where the Patent Act is
63
found to be ambiguous.
Moreover, for purposes of evaluating the benefits of Chevron
deference for PTAB interpretations, the more important court is not
the Supreme Court, but the Federal Circuit, which, as noted in Part

(2014) (quoting John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041, 1110–11 (2011)).
61. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1597–98.
62. Id. (citing William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1125, 1142–43 (2008)).
63. The PTO should exercise caution, however, in reading too much into pre-Chevron
judicial declarations of statutory ambiguity. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,
LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842–44 (2012) (reaffirming the Brand X principle but rejecting the
agency’s argument that a 1958 Supreme Court opinion stating that a statute is ambiguous
creates space for subsequent agency interpretation when the statute is in fact unambiguous).
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II.B, has exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related appeals. At the
lower-court level, the effect of Chevron deference would be greater.
After all, the Supreme Court reviews only a fraction of Federal
Circuit opinions. The Court might well be less likely to review a
Federal Circuit opinion that merely affirms the agency’s statutory
interpretation as reasonable under Chevron. Conversely, a Federal
Circuit decision refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation would
arguably be an even more attractive candidate for Supreme Court
review; not only did the Federal Circuit potentially get substantive
patent law wrong, but it also overturned an agency’s authoritative
interpretation of that law.
Indeed, if the Eskridge and Baer findings about the Supreme
Court’s inconsistent application of Chevron deference hold true
today, a declaration that Chevron applies to the PTO’s interpretation
of substantive patent law would rein in the Federal Circuit without
limiting the Supreme Court’s subsequent review. Accordingly, the
impact of a Supreme Court declaration that the PTO—not the
Federal Circuit—is the authoritative interpreter of substantive patent
64
law should not be undervalued.
CONCLUSION
Professors Benjamin and Rai have made a strong case for the
Supreme Court to abandon patent exceptionalism and apply Chevron
deference to certain PTAB interpretations of substantive patent law.
But they stop short of making the case for the PTO to request such
deference. Instead, they conclude that “the PTO’s failure to push for
deference may reflect a calculation that the benefits of such a push
65
will be fairly low.” To the contrary, the PTO—with the help of its
DOJ litigators—has potent legal arguments to overturn an era of
64. Professors Benjamin and Rai also theorize that “[i]t could be that agencies are much
more aggressive when they know that Chevron deference will apply, so the lower rate in
Chevron cases simply reflects agencies’ greater aggressiveness in statutory interpretation.”
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1598. My empirical work seems to support this intuition. See
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721–25, 722 fig.3 (2014) (finding that the vast majority of agency rule
drafters surveyed understand that their chances in court are better under Chevron than
Skidmore and that two in five rule drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed—and another
two in five somewhat agreed—that a federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive efforts
if it is confident Chevron deference applies); see also Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1048–66 (2015) (exploring the study’s
administrative law findings in greater detail).
65. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 4, at 1599.
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patent stare decisis and disempower the Federal Circuit as primary
interpreter of substantive patent law. Perhaps the Court’s
forthcoming decision in Cuozzo will spark this movement against
patent exceptionalism.
Administrative law exceptionalism, however, does not usually
die on its own. Among the important lessons learned from tax law’s
retreat from exceptionalism is that law professors can play a crucial
role. As I have detailed elsewhere, in the case of tax exceptionalism,
Kristin Hickman led a decade-long charge in both law reviews and
amicus briefs by calling for, among other things, Chevron deference
to apply to statutory interpretations promulgated by the Internal
66
Revenue Service (IRS). Those efforts culminated in 2011, when the
Supreme Court agreed that certain IRS statutory interpretations are
67
eligible for Chevron deference. The D.C. Circuit and the Tax Court
have since followed suit by rejecting administrative law
68
exceptionalism in other areas of tax law.
Hopefully patent law scholars will follow Professor Hickman’s
lead and make similar calls for the Supreme Court to reverse course
in patent law. Professors Benjamin and Rai have established a solid
substantive foundation for such advocacy.

66. See Christopher J. Walker, Taking Administrative Law to Tax Exceptionalism,
JOTWELL
(Aug.
12,
2014), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/taking-administrative-law-to-taxexceptionalism [https://perma.cc/D6KC-75D7].
67. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011).
68. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(holding that the judicial review provisions of the APA apply with full force to an IRS notice
because “[t]he IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest
of the Federal Government—from suit under the APA”); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No.
3, 2015 WL 4522662, at *28 (T.C. July 27, 2015) (invalidating income tax regulations because
they were not the product of “reasoned decisionmaking” as required by the APA and related
administrative law precedent).

